2014/07/11 by Czumaj, Artur, Fasoulakis, Michail, Jurdziński, Marcin
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1407.3004
The ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than ε to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed strategy. The smallest constant ε currently known for which there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games is slightly below 2/3. In this paper we study this problem for symmetric bimatrix games and we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a (1/2+δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium, for an arbitrarily small positive constant δ.