Equilibria of Polymatrix Games

1972/01/01 by Joseph T. Howson · 5 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Decision Sciences · Computer Science · #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Game Theory and Applications #Optimization and Variational Analysis

paper · doi:10.1287/mnsc.18.5.312

Abstract

A constructive existence proof is given for equilibria of polymatrix games. The construction is based on a generalization of the almost-complementary paths used for the linear complementarity problem.

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