2022/03/15 by Yazhou Tu, Tu, Yazhou, Sara Rampazzi +3
Computer Science · Engineering · #Actuator #Adversarial system #Artificial intelligence #Automation #Computer science #Computer security #Control (management) #Control engineering #Control system #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #Cyber-physical system #Domain (mathematical analysis) #Electrostatic Discharge in Electronics #Engineering #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #Kinematics #Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security #Process (computing) #Reliability (semiconductor) #Robot #Robotics #Security domain #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #cs.CR #cs.SY #eess.SY #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2203.07670
arxiv created 2022/03/15 · openalex publication_date 2022/03/15 · arxiv updated 2022/03/16 · openalex created_date 2022/04/03 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Recent works investigated attacks on sensors by influencing analog sensor components with acoustic, light, and electromagnetic signals. Such attacks can have extensive security, reliability, and safety implications since many types of the targeted sensors are also widely used in critical process control, robotics, automation, and industrial control systems. While existing works advanced our understanding of the physical-level risks that are hidden from a digital-domain perspective, gaps exist in how the attack can be guided to achieve system-level control in real-time, continuous processes. This paper proposes an adversarial control loop-based approach for real-time attacks on control systems relying on sensors. We study how to utilize the system feedback extracted from physical-domain signals to guide the attacks. In the attack process, injection signals are adjusted in real time based on the extracted feedback to exert targeted influence on a victim control system that is continuously affected by the injected perturbations and applying changes to the physical environment. In our case study, we investigate how an external adversarial control system can be constructed over sensor-actuator systems and demonstrate the attacks with program-controlled processes to manipulate the victim system without accessing its internal statuses.