2016/04/15 by Wenjing Shuai, Shuai, Wenjing, Patrick Maillé +3
Energy · Engineering · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure #Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Smart Grid Energy Management #Transportation and Mobility Innovations
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1604.04579
openalex publication_date 2016/04/15 · openalex created_date 2022/10/05 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
This paper models a non-cooperative game between two EV charging stations.\nOne is a fixed-power charging station purchasing electricity from the grid at\nwholesale price and reselling the energy to EV owners at a higher retail price;\nthe other is regulation-providing and varies the recharging power level of its\nclients to provide regulation services to the grid, so its profit comes from\nboth EV owners (who buy energy) and the grid (which pays for regulation\nservices). Users are reluctant to charging power variations and prefer shorter\noverall charging times, hence regulation-providing charging has to be cheaper\nthan fixed-power charging.\n We analyze the competition among those charging providers, and examine the\nperformance at the equilibrium in terms of user welfare, station revenue and\nelectricity prices. As expected, competing stations provide users with lower\ncharging prices than when both charging solutions are offered by a monopolistic\nprovider. Moreover, while competition benefits users, it also benefits the grid\nin that the amount of regulation services increases significantly with respect\nto the monopolistic case.\n