2016/11/30 by Arnob Ghosh, Ghosh, Arnob, Vaneet Aggarwal +1
Engineering · #Advanced Battery Technologies Research #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #Transportation and Mobility Innovations #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1612.00106
openalex publication_date 2016/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The paper considers a bidirectional power flow model of the electric vehicles (EVs) in a charging station. The EVs can inject energies by discharging via a Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) service which can enhance the profits of the charging station. However, frequent charging and discharging degrade battery life. A proper compensation needs to be paid to the users to participate in the V2G service. We propose a menu-based pricing scheme, where the charging station selects a price for each arriving user for the amount of battery utilization, the total energy, and the time (deadline) that the EV will stay. The user can accept one of the contracts or rejects all depending on their utilities. The charging station can serve users using a combination of the renewable energy and the conventional energy bought from the grid. We show that though there exists a profit maximizing price which maximizes the social welfare, it provides no surplus to the users if the charging station is aware of the utilities of the users. If the charging station is not aware of the exact utilities, the social welfare maximizing price may not maximize the expected profit. In fact, it can give a zero profit. We propose a pricing strategy which provides a guaranteed fixed profit to the charging station and it also maximizes the expected profit for a wide range of utility functions. Our analysis shows that when the harvested renewable energy is small the users have higher incentives for the V2G service. We, numerically, show that the charging station's profit and the user's surplus both increase as V2G service is efficiently utilized by the pricing mechanism.