2026/07/22 by Alexander Sasha Arridge
Psychology · Arts and Humanities · #Leadership, Courage, and Heroism Studies #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Emotions and Moral Behavior
paper · doi:10.1007/s11098-026-02569-z
Abstract The phenomenology of heroic action seems to be at odds with commonsense morality: while the latter tells us that heroic acts of self-sacrifice are morally optional, heroes reliably believe that such acts are morally required of them. Do heroes systematically exhibit false moral beliefs, or does our commonsense commitment to the possibility of supererogation need revising? This paper argues, contrary to both supererogationists and anti-supererogationists, that we need not decide: as what we are morally required to do depends on how virtuous we are, heroes are right to believe that heroic actions are morally required of them , while ordinary folk morality is right that, for ordinary folk , these very same actions are morally optional. I arrive at this conclusion by supplementing the foremost contemporary account of supererogation with two naturally plausible claims about the virtue of selflessness.