How Should We Understand the Balancing View of Ought?

2025/06/16 by A. S. Arridge · 1 voice · 1 citation
Psychology · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science

paper · doi:10.1086/735392

openalex publication_date 2025/06/16 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Thomas Schmidt argues that a widely held combination of views about reasons and ought—the Balancing View of Ought and the claim that reasons against ϕ are reasons for not-ϕ—is extensionally adequate only if it is complemented by two principles of reasons transmission. This article presents five problems for Schmidt’s package of views and defends a rival package of views—a version of the Balancing View and the claim that reasons against ϕ are reasons that bear on ϕ with negative weight—that friends of the Balancing View should prefer.

Citations

• The Balancing View of Ought

Cited by

• Morality demands more of you the better you are

Discussions

• A.S. Arridge discusses Thomas Schmidt’s previous ETHIC article, “The Balancing View of Ought” with How Should We Understand the Balancing View of Ought? at doi.org/10.1086/735392 philsky #PolTheory #l [bsky, 1 points, 0 comments]

Related

• The Balancing View of Ought
• The Principle of Insufficient Reason
• Reasons First
• The principle of sufficient reason and necessitarianism
• Does “Ought” Imply “Feasible”?