2026/07/10 by Julia Mosquera
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Affect (linguistics) #Ambivalence #Emotions and Moral Behavior #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Focus (optics) #Normative #Philosophical Ethics and Theory
paper · doi:10.1093/pq/pqag036
published in The Philosophical Quarterly (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2026/07/10 · openalex created_date 2026/07/26 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/26
Abstract Uncertainty shapes what we believe, how we act, and how we live—and it also affects our emotions, with important implications for private and public life. This paper develops an account of affective uncertainty, which arises when competing appropriate emotions leave us unsure how to feel overall—what I call affective dilemmas. Despite its significance, affective uncertainty has been largely overlooked by philosophers of uncertainty, who focus on epistemic and moral uncertainty, and by philosophers of emotion, who often adopt a narrower view of affective normativity. I argue that affective uncertainty is irreducible to epistemic or moral uncertainty, as it stems from affective incommensurability—the incommensurability of the values that justify different emotions. I suggest that existing uncertainty frameworks—including those for normative uncertainty—fail to address it, and that in some cases affective ambivalence may be the appropriate response.