2022/09/28 by Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni · 33 citations
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Cognition #Cognitive psychology #Computer science #Emotions and Moral Behavior #Epistemology #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Judgement #Philosophy #Psychology #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Simple (philosophy) #Social psychology #Variety (cybernetics)
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2126147
published in Inquiry 68(1), 91-113 (Taylor & Francis)
openalex publication_date 2022/09/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Contemporary philosophers are attracted by the Indispensability Claim, according to which emotions are indispensable in acquiring knowledge of some important values. The truth of this claim is often thought to depend on that of Emotional Dogmatism, the view that emotions justify evaluative judgements because they (seem to) make us aware of the relevant values. The aim of this paper is to show that the Indispensability Claim does not stand or fall with Emotional Dogmatism and that there is actually an attractive alternative way of developing it. We first argue that the Indispensability Claim requires a deflationary account of the cognitive bases of emotions, which we call the Simple View and defend against a variety of criticisms. Armed with the Simple View, we show that the Indispensability Claim is made true by three roles of the emotions: they help us access the relevant evidence, provide a needed hook-up between evidence and judgement, and contribute to evaluative understanding.