2018/02/15 by Shane Martin, Tim A Mickler, Tim Alexander Mickler · 38 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Engineering · Social Sciences · #Context (archaeology) #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Engineering #History #Law #Legislature #Political Influence and Corporate Strategies #Political science #Politics #Public Policy and Administration Research #Public administration #Public relations #Select committee #Sociology #Work (physics)
paper · open access · doi:10.1093/pa/gsy015
published in Parliamentary Affairs 72(1), 77-98 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2018/02/15 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
Conventional wisdom suggests that a strong legislature is built on a strong internal committee system, both in terms of committee powers and the willingness of members to engage in committee work. Committee assignments are the behavioural manifestation of legislative organisation. Despite this, much remains unknown about how committee assignments happen and with what causes and consequences. Our focus in this article is on providing the context for, and introducing new research on, what we call the political economy of committee assignments—which members get selected to sit on which committees, why and with what consequences.