2014/04/01 by J. Genone, James Genone · 117 citations
Arts and Humanities · Mathematics · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Aesthetic Perception and Analysis #Cognitive psychology #Epistemology #Illusion #Matching (statistics) #Mathematics #Optical illusion #Perception #Philosophy #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Psychology #Social psychology
paper · doi:10.1093/mind/fzu056
published in Mind 123(490), 339-376 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2014/04/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. In this essay, I explain that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. I then show how the relational view can claim that errors associated with perception should be explained in terms of false judgements, and develop a theory of illusions based on the idea that appearances are properties of objects in the surrounding environment. I provide an account of why appearances are sometimes misleading, and conclude by showing how the availability of this view undermines one of the most common ways of motivating representationalist theories of perception.