2018/12/28 by Farid Masrour · 49 citations
Arts and Humanities · Mathematics · Medicine · Psychology · #A priori and a posteriori #Argument (complex analysis) #Cognitive psychology #Corollary #Epistemology #Mathematics #Medicine #Mental Health and Psychiatry #Perception #Philosophy #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Psychology #Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
paper · open access · doi:10.1093/mind/fzy088
published in Mind 129(515), 737-768 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2018/12/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Abstract Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A corollary upshot of the article is that whether hallucinations are possible or not is still an open empirical question.