2021/02/11 by Valentin Goranko, Goranko, Valentin, Fengkui Ju +1 · 1 citation
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #03B42 #03B45 #03B70 #03B80 #68T27 #68T30 #68T37 #91A26 #91A40 #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #F.4.1 #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Voting Systems #I.2.3 #I.2.4 #Logic (math.LO) #Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO) #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2102.06148
openalex publication_date 2021/02/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We consider systems of rational agents who act and interact in pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. We study and formalise the reasoning of an agent, or of an external observer, about the expected choices of action of the other agents based on their objectives, in order to assess the reasoner's ability, or expectation, to achieve their own objective. To formalize such reasoning we extend Pauly's Coalition Logic with three new modal operators of conditional strategic reasoning, thus introducing the Logic for Local Conditional Strategic Reasoning ConStR. We provide formal semantics for the new conditional strategic operators in concurrent game models, introduce the matching notion of bisimulation for each of them, prove bisimulation invariance and Hennessy-Milner property for each of them, and discuss and compare briefly their expressiveness. Finally, we also propose systems of axioms for each of the basic operators of ConStR and for the full logic.