2024/09/23 by Yinfeng Li, Li, Yinfeng, Fengkui Ju +1
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Logic (math.LO) #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.14635
openalex publication_date 2024/09/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence of agents, and determinism. They presented a Minimal Coalition Logic based on general concurrent game models, which do not have the three assumptions. However, when constructing coalition logics about strategic reasoning in special kinds of situations, we may want to keep some of the assumptions. Thus, studying coalition logics with some of these assumptions makes good sense. In this paper, we show the completeness of these coalition logics in a uniform way.