Assessing and countering reaction attacks against post-quantum\n public-key cryptosystems based on QC-LDPC codes

2018/08/06 by Paolo Santini, Marco Baldi, Santini, Paolo +3
Computer Science · #Coding theory and cryptography #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Information Theory (cs.IT) #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum-Dot Cellular Automata

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1808.01945

openalex publication_date 2018/08/06 · openalex created_date 2022/08/04 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Code-based public-key cryptosystems based on QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC codes are\npromising post-quantum candidates to replace quantum vulnerable classical\nalternatives. However, a new type of attacks based on Bob's reactions have\nrecently been introduced and appear to significantly reduce the length of the\nlife of any keypair used in these systems. In this paper we estimate the\ncomplexity of all known reaction attacks against QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based\nvariants of the McEliece cryptosystem. We also show how the structure of the\nsecret key and, in particular, the secret code rate affect the complexity of\nthese attacks. It follows from our results that QC-LDPC code-based systems can\nindeed withstand reaction attacks, on condition that some specific decoding\nalgorithms are used and the secret code has a sufficiently high rate.\n

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