2019/04/27 by P. Santini, Santini, Paolo, Massimo Battaglioni +5 · 1 citation
Computer Science · #Coding theory and cryptography #Cryptographic Implementations and Security #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Information Theory (cs.IT) #Quantum-Dot Cellular Automata
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1904.12215
openalex publication_date 2019/04/27 · openalex created_date 2022/07/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems\nbased on sparse parity-check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check\n(LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. We show that the\nfeasibility of these attacks is not strictly associated to the quasi-cyclic\n(QC) structure of the code but is related to the intrinsically probabilistic\ndecoding of any sparse parity-check code. So, these attacks not only work\nagainst QC codes, but can be generalized to broader classes of codes. We\nprovide a novel algorithm that, in the case of a QC code, allows recovering a\nlarger amount of information than that retrievable through existing attacks and\nwe use this algorithm to characterize new side-channel information leakages. We\ndevise a theoretical model for the decoder that describes and justifies our\nresults. Numerical simulations are provided that confirm the effectiveness of\nour approach.\n