2005/07/01 by Elemér E Rosinger, Elemer E Rosinger, Rosinger, Elemer E
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · Social Sciences · #Economic theories and models #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #math.OC
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.math/0507013
openalex publication_date 2005/07/01 · arxiv created 2005/07/04 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption. Furthermore, in practice, this cooperation assumption is simply unrealistic.