2008/06/12 by Joseph Y. Halpern, Halpern, Joseph Y. · 1 citation
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #C.2.4 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #Distributed #F.0 #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #I.2.11 #J.4 #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Parallel #and Cluster Computing (cs.DC)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0806.2139
openalex publication_date 2008/06/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma is neither normatively nor descriptively reasonable. However, new problems arise when considering Nash equilibrium from a computer science perspective: for example, Nash equilibrium is not robust (it does not tolerate ``faulty'' or ``unexpected'' behavior), it does not deal with coalitions, it does not take computation cost into account, and it does not deal with cases where players are not aware of all aspects of the game. Solution concepts that try to address these shortcomings of Nash equilibrium are discussed.