2003/03/01 by Karl V. Lins · 3 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Corporate Finance and Governance #Banking stability, regulation, efficiency #Private Equity and Venture Capital
paper · doi:10.2307/4126768
This paper investigates whether management stock ownership and large non-management blockholder share ownership are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets. When a management group's control rights exceed its cash flow rights, I find that firm values are lower. I also find that large non-management control rights blockholdings are positively related to firm value. Both of these effects are significantly more pronounced in countries with low shareholder protection. One interpretation of these results is that external shareholder protection mechanisms play a role in restraining managerial agency costs and that large non-management blockholders can act as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms.