Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments

1990/06/01 by Anup Agrawal, Gershon N. Mandelker, Gershon Mandelker · 1 citation
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Corporate Finance and Governance #Financial Markets and Investment Strategies #Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance

paper · doi:10.2307/2330821

Abstract

Anup Agrawal, Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 143-161

Citations

• Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

Cited by

• Trust, business group verticality, and firm productivity

Related

• Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders
• The Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and Shareholder Reactions
• Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
• The Influential Role of Independent Auditors in Mitigating Agency Conflicts between Managers and Shareholders
• Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia