Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders

1996/09/01 by Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber · 10 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Corporate Finance and Governance #Economic Policies and Impacts #Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance

paper · doi:10.2307/2331397

Abstract

Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 377-397

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