2013/09/24 by George O. Aragon, Michael Hertzel, Michael G. Hertzel +1
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Financial Markets and Investment Strategies #Banking stability, regulation, efficiency #Insurance and Financial Risk Management
paper · doi:10.1017/s0022109013000483
Abstract We study a sample of Form 13F filings where fund advisors seek confidential treatment for some or all of their 13(f)-reportable positions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information, we find that confidential positions earn positive and significant abnormal returns over the post-filing confidential period. We also find that managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions that are more susceptible to front-running. Overall, our analysis highlights important benefits of reduced disclosure that are relevant to the current policy debate on hedge fund transparency.