2011/07/01 by Hans Dubois, Giovanni Fattore · 8 citations
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Regional Development and Policy #Local Government Finance and Decentralization #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth #Proxy (statistics) #Context (archaeology) #Selection (genetic algorithm) #Payment #Public economics #European union #Business #Politics #Economics #Scope (computer science) #Actuarial science #Finance #Computer science #Political science #Economic policy
paper · doi:10.1080/13597566.2011.578827
published in Regional & Federal Studies 21(3), 355-374 (Taylor & Francis)
openalex publication_date 2011/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Public funds are allocated increasingly through dynamic mechanisms, such as project selection, and less through allocation formulas. While costly, potential benefits of project selection include better projects, less corruption and better targeted allocations. We challenge these benefits theoretically and test our arguments empirically by assessing an explanatory model of fund assignment. Our specific context involves the Polish 2004–06 Interregional Operational Programmes, with regions in charge of distributing European Union Structural Funds. Results suggest assignment to be largely captured by an easy-to-measure variable, population size. Assignment further seems to somewhat contradict overall programme purposes, potentially feeding intra-regional inequality. Co-payment requirements are a likely explanation. These results challenge the three arguments in favour of project selection. On the other hand, further results support arguments in favour of project selection. While our proxy for personal links between assigning and receiving entities shows a significant result, it explains very little. Moreover, we did not find any impact of political ties. Overall the picture is mixed and our research is restricted to only three potential benefits of project selection.