2017/11/07 by Emekcan Aras, Nicolas Small, Gowri Sankar Ramachandran +4 · 96 citations
Computer Science · Engineering · #Attack surface #Bluetooth and Wireless Communication Technologies #Business #Commodity #Computer science #Computer security #Embedded system #Energy Harvesting in Wireless Networks #Exploit #Internet of Things #IoT Networks and Protocols #Jamming #Key (lock) #LPWAN #Suite #cs.NI
paper · pdf · doi:10.1145/3144457.3144478
Mobiquitous 2017, November 7-10, 2017, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
openalex publication_date 2017/11/07 · arxiv created 2017/12/06 · arxiv updated 2017/12/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Long range, low power networks are rapidly gaining acceptance in the Internet of Things (IoT) due to their ability to economically support long-range sensing and control applications while providing multi-year battery life. LoRa is a key example of this new class of network and is being deployed at large scale in several countries worldwide. As these networks move out of the lab and into the real world, they expose a large cyber-physical attack surface. Securing these networks is therefore both critical and urgent. This paper highlights security issues in LoRa and LoRaWAN that arise due to the choice of a robust but slow modulation type in the protocol. We exploit these issues to develop a suite of practical attacks based around selective jamming. These attacks are conducted and evaluated using commodity hardware. The paper concludes by suggesting a range of countermeasures that can be used to mitigate the attacks.