2019/03/01 by Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris · 515 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Decision Sciences · #Algorithm #Artificial intelligence #Auction Theory and Applications #Bayesian game #Commit #Complete information #Computer science #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #Economics #Game Theory and Applications #Game theory #Human–computer interaction #Information design #Interpretation (philosophy) #Literal (mathematical logic) #Mathematical economics #Perfect information #Perspective (graphical) #Programming language #Repeated game #Set (abstract data type)
paper · doi:10.1257/jel.20181489
published in Journal of Economic Literature 57(1), 44-95 (American Economic Association)
openalex publication_date 2019/03/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information. ( JEL C70, D82, D83)