A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

1982/09/01 by Paul R. Milgrom, Paul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber · 3,846 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Bidding #Common value auction #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #Economics #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Microeconomics

paper · doi:10.2307/1911865

published in Econometrica 50(5), 1089 (Wiley)

openalex publication_date 1982/09/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30

Abstract

Abstract : In Section 2, we review some important results of the received auction theory, introduce a new general auction model, and summarize the results of our analysis. Section 3 contains a formal statement of our model, and develops the properties of affiliated random variables. The various theorems are presented in Sections 4-8. In Section 9, we offer our views on the current state of auction theory. Following Section 9 is a technical appendix dealing with affiliated random variables.

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