2009/09/01 by Matthew Hughes · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Military History and Strategy #World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact #Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East #Punitive damages #Colonialism #Law #Power (physics) #Political science #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1080/09592310903027090
openalex publication_date 2009/09/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.