Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

2000/08/01 by Элинор Остром · 5 citations
Social Sciences · Decision Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications #Collective action #Action (physics) #Dilemma #Nonmarket forces #Social dilemma #Microeconomics #Economics #Positive economics #Public good #Political science #Epistemology #Law

paper · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137

openalex publication_date 2000/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05

Abstract

I assume multiple types of players--“rational egoists,” as well as “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers”--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.

Citations

• Why free ride?
• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
• Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
• An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
• Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory
• Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
• The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
• Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments

Cited by

• Doves and hawks in economics revisited: An evolutionary quantum game theory based analysis of financial crises
• Gender, social norms, and survival in maritime disasters
• Promoting Cooperation in the Public Goods Game using Artificial Intelligent Agents
• Can community outreach alleviate poaching pressure and recover wildlife in South‐East Asian protected areas?
• Collective action [wikipedia]