2016/09/13 by Philippe Lagassé · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #International Law and Human Rights #American Constitutional Law and Politics #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Prerogative #Legislature #Parliament #House of Commons #Political science #Law #Kingdom #Public administration #Convention #Politics
paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/pa/gsw029
openalex publication_date 2016/09/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
The British and Canadian Parliaments have no legal control over military deployment decisions. Recently, however, governments in both countries have held votes in the House of Commons on expeditionary missions involving combat. In the United Kingdom, this has led to a convention of legislative control of the executive’s prerogative to deploy the armed forces. In Canada, the votes have benefited and enabled the executive, rather than strengthening legislative control. Using Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory of gradual institutional change, this article analyses how and why war prerogative reforms in the United Kingdom and Canada have resulted in different outcomes.