2025/08/13 by Thomas Verellen · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Economic Sanctions and International Relations #European Union Policy and Governance #International Relations and Foreign Policy
paper · pdf · doi:10.22215/cjers.v18i2.5047
openalex publication_date 2025/08/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
This paper explores the role of parliaments in sanctions policy in Canada, the United States, and the European Union. The study contrasts the varying levels of parliamentary involvement and oversight within these jurisdictions. It highlights Canada’s formal but underutilized parliamentary powers, the proactive legislative role of the US Congress that actively shapes and monitors sanctions policy, and the EU’s executive-dominated approach with limited parliamentary input. The findings partially refute the hypothesis that parliaments play a marginal role in sanctions policy and underscore the importance of robust legislative oversight in ensuring that sanctions policies are democratically accountable.