The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited

2006/10/09 by FRITZ W. SCHARPF, Fritz W. Scharpf · 10 citations
Social Sciences · #European Union Policy and Governance #European and International Law Studies #Social Policy and Reform Studies

paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00665.x

Abstract

The original analysis appears as a basically valid - if simplified - account of the institutional conditions of political policy choices in the EU and their consequences. It needs to be complemented, however, by a similar account of non-political policy-making in the supranational-hierarchical mode of governance by the ECB or ECJ.

Cited by

• Reforming me softly – how soft law has changed EU return policy since the migration crisis
• Policy Dynamics in the European Union
• Das Ende von negativer und positiver Integration? Wie die politökonomische Heterogenität und prozedurale Entscheidungshürden den Verlauf der europäischen Integration weiterhin prägen
• Asymmetry resolved? Revisiting negative and positive European integration
• The subsidiarity trap: how EU constitutional architecture perpetuates regional decline
• Withering the exogenous shock: EU policy responses to the Russian war against Ukraine
• What Explains German Länder Governments’ Stances Towards Federalism?
• Inside the federal machine: explaining sub-federal roles in implementing international agreements
• High politics in the Low Countries: COVID-19 and the politics of strained multi-level policy cooperation in Belgium and the Netherlands. [europepmc]
• Intergovernmental policy opportunities for childhood obesity prevention in Australia: Perspectives from senior officials. [europepmc]

Related

• Informal procedures, institutional change, and EU decision-making: evaluating the effects of the 1974 Paris summit
• The European Union: From a Complex Adaptive System to a Policy Interpreter
• Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach
• Sub‐National Mobilization and European Integration: Does it Make any Difference?
• Clarity of Responsibility Beyond the Pocketbook: How Political Institutions Condition EU Issue Voting