2025/06/06 by Martin Höpner, Susanne K. Schmidt, Daniel Seikel · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #European Socioeconomic and Political Studies #European Union Policy and Governance
paper · doi:10.1080/13501763.2025.2512897
openalex publication_date 2025/06/06 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
This article revisits Fritz W. Scharpf’s influential theory of an institutional asymmetry between negative and positive integration in the European Union. While negative integration – driven primarily by judicial enforcement of freedoms, competition law and individual rights to non-discrimination – can proceed without majoritarian consensus, positive integration requires political agreement among heterogeneous Member States. We engage critically with recent literature that argues that the EU has overcome this asymmetrical setting. Despite significant changes in the EU over the past 25 years, including enlargement, expansion of the EU’s fields of activity and new legislative initiatives in the field of social policy, we argue that the structural bias Scharpf identified remains relevant. The procedural advantages of negative integration continue to constrain Member States’ regulatory autonomy and reinforce liberalising dynamics, while the difficulties of using positive integration to mitigate the impact of negative integration remain. The asymmetry, though nuanced, persists.