2019/04/25 by Regina Smyth, William T. Bianco, Kwan Nok Chan · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Political Systems and Governance
paper · doi:10.1086/703068
openalex publication_date 2019/04/25 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11
This article focuses on the manipulation of legislative rules in electoral authoritarian states. Electoral liberalization in authoritarian regimes creates the capacity for opposition forces to win legislative seats, but it does not ensure voice in the policy process. While the literature on institutional authoritarianism points to co-optation, dominant parties, and redistribution as mechanisms to control policy outcomes in authoritarian legislatures, we investigate an additional possibility: that electoral authoritarian regimes (EARs) select legislative institutions that allow free debate and unconstrained voting yet decouple electoral success from policy influence. Our analysis centers on the EAR in Hong Kong and its legislature, the Legislative Council (LegCo). We find that the LegCo’s rules of procedure interact with electoral institutions to create considerable roadblocks to opposition initiatives, while at the same time facilitating the enactment of regime policies.