2014/11/10 by Merete Bech Seeberg · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Political Conflict and Governance #Asian Studies and History #Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies
paper · doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.960210
openalex publication_date 2014/11/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
A “paradox of authoritarian elections” prevails: While some researchers emphasize the stabilizing effect of authoritarian multi-party elections, others point to their potential for regime subversion. I argue that the effect of elections will likely depend on the capacities of the authoritarian regime in which they take place. In particular, state capacity may influence the relationship between authoritarian elections and regime stability. Autocrats presiding over a highly capable state may abuse the bureaucracy to subtly manipulate voters and the electoral framework. And a strong coercive apparatus serves to prevent opposition mobilization and post-electoral protests. Thus, elections are more likely to stabilize authoritarian regimes endowed with high levels of state capacity. Where state capacity is low, elections are more likely to spin out of control, or the regime may be forced to turn to more blatant forms of fraud or large-scale violence, which tend to cause regime destabilization. The proposed relationship is illustrated in two cases. In Malaysia, a strong state has been an asset in the quest to use authoritarian elections to secure one-party dominance. In the Philippines, the Marcos dictatorship was equipped with a weaker state and collapsed in the failed effort to control the 1986 electoral contest.