Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer

2002/08/01 by P.-A. Chiappori, Steven D. Levitt, Tim Groseclose · 2 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · Business, Management and Accounting · #Sports Analytics and Performance #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing

paper · doi:10.1257/00028280260344678

openalex publication_date 2002/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31

Abstract

Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer by P.-A. Chiappori, S. Levitt and T. Groseclose. Published in volume 92, issue 4, pages 1138-1151 of American Economic Review, September 2002

Citations

• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Favoritism Under Social Pressure

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