Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points

1973/12/01 by John C. Harsanyi · 13 citations
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Economic theories and models #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems

paper · doi:10.1007/bf01737554

crossref issued 1973/12/01 · crossref published 1973/12/01 · crossref published-print 1973/12/01 · openalex publication_date 1973/12/01 · crossref created 2005/06/16 · crossref deposited 2020/04/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref indexed 2026/07/03 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29

Citations

• Non-Cooperative Games

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