Animals, Predators, the Right to Life, and the Duty to Save Lives

2009/03/01 by Aaron Simmons · 2 citations
Environmental Science · Arts and Humanities · #Environmental Philosophy and Ethics #Theology and Philosophy of Evil #Philosophical Ethics and Theory

paper · doi:10.2979/ete.2009.14.1.15

openalex publication_date 2009/03/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/04/05

Abstract

One challenge to the idea that animals have a moral right to life claims that any such right would require us to intervene in the wild to prevent animals from being killed by predators. I argue that belief in an animal right to life does not commit us to supporting a program of predator-prey intervention. One common retort to the predator challenge contends that we are not required to save animals from predators because predators are not moral agents. I suggest that this retort fails to overcome the predator challenge. I seek to articulate a more satisfactory argument explaining why we are not required to save wild prey from predators and how this position is perfectly consistent with the idea that animals have a basic right to life.

Cited by

• Should the Lion Eat Straw Like the Ox? Animal Ethics and the Predation Problem
• Predation problem [wikipedia]

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