Against the View That We Are Normally Required to Assist Wild Animals

2015/11/01 by Clare Palmer · 3 citations
Arts and Humanities · Environmental Science · #Environmental Philosophy and Ethics #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Theology and Philosophy of Evil

paper · doi:10.7358/rela-2015-002-palm

openalex publication_date 2015/11/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22

Abstract

In this brief paper, I will defend the position that while sentient animals are morally considerable, we are not normally morally required to assist suffering wild animals, though this does not mean that it is ethically impermissible to do so. I will argue that this position can be defended without denying that we have obligations to assist distant suffering humans, and that it need not rely on the claim that there is something wrong with intervening in human-independent processes (“the wild”). For the purposes of this paper I will just assume that sentient animals are morally considerable. This view is widely accepted and not particularly controversial (see Palmer 2010 for a more substantial defense of this view).

Cited by

• The Case for Welfare Biology
• Should the Lion Eat Straw Like the Ox? Animal Ethics and the Predation Problem
• Clare Palmer [wikipedia]

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