The British Decision to Upgrade Polaris, 1970–4

2013/04/04 by Helen Parr · 3 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · Arts and Humanities · #Defense, Military, and Policy Studies #Nuclear Issues and Defense #Twentieth Century Scientific Developments

paper · doi:10.1017/s0960777313000076

openalex publication_date 2013/04/04 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21

Abstract

Abstract This article adopts a political approach to examine the reasons why Edward Heath's government wanted to upgrade Polaris and the reasons why they did so by way of a programme called Super Antelope, to improve the front-ends of the missiles against Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile defence, as opposed to the alternatives on offer. It argues that the political contexts within which Heath took the decision have been insufficiently understood, and shows that the acceptance of the ‘Moscow criterion’ – the understanding that Britain had to have the capability to destroy Moscow – by central government represented continuity in Britain's cold war stance.

Citations

• In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris Nuclear Project 1962–1968

Cited by

• A Foregone Conclusion? The United States, Britain and the Trident D5 Agreement
• Preserving the Global Nuclear Order: The Trident Agreements and the Arms Control Debate, 1977–1982
• UGM-27 Polaris [wikipedia]

Related

• Peripheral vision
• Introduction: social and cultural histories of British nuclear mobilisation since 1945
• ‘RUSSIA WINS SPACE RACE’
• Architects of Armageddon: the Home Office Scientific Advisers' Branch and civil defence in Britain, 1945–68
• ‘No protection against the H-bomb’: press and popular reactions to the Coventry civil defence controversy, 1954