2000/10/01 by George Tsebelis · 2 citations
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Local Government Finance and Decentralization #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
paper · doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00141
openalex publication_date 2000/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one‐, two‐, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.