2013/08/28 by Justin Jee, Andrew Sundstrom, Steven E. Massey +1 · 1 citation
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #RNA and protein synthesis mechanisms #Gene Regulatory Network Analysis
paper · pdf · doi:10.1098/rsif.2013.0614
openalex publication_date 2013/08/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/24
This paper describes a novel application of information-asymmetric (signalling) games to molecular biology in which utility is determined by the message complexity (rate) in addition to the error in information transfer (distortion). We show using a computational model how it is possible for the agents in one such game to evolve a signalling convention (separating equilibrium) that is suboptimal in terms of information transfer, but is nonetheless stable. In the context of an RNA world merging with a nascent amino acid one, such a game's equilibrium is alluded to by the genetic code, which is nearly optimal in terms of information transfer, but is also near-universal and nearly immutable. Such a framework suggests that cellularity may have emerged to encourage coordination between RNA species and sheds light on other aspects of RNA world biochemistry yet to be fully understood.