2009/01/08 by Steven Levitsky, María Victoria Murillo · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Social Policy and Reform Studies #Political Conflict and Governance #Corruption and Economic Development
paper · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756
openalex publication_date 2009/01/08 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
Comparative research on political institutions has begun to turn from issues of formal institutional design to issues of institutional strength. Rather than assuming a tight fit between formal rules and political behavior, these studies examine how variation in the stability and/or enforcement of formal rules shapes actors' expectations and behavior. This article explores the emerging research agenda on institutional strength. It disaggregates the concept of institutional strength into two dimensions—enforcement and stability—and it argues that institutions vary widely on both dimensions. The article then examines the sources of this variation and its implications for comparative research. It shows how recent research on weak institutions may be used to refine existing theories of institutional effects, design, and development, which should broaden the comparative scope of these theories. The conclusion examines ways of developing comparative measures of institutional strength.