Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography

2013/10/31 by Audun N. Bugge, Sebastien Sauge, Aina M. M. Ghazali +3 · 3 citations
Physics and Astronomy · #quant-ph #physics.ins-det

paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.112.070503

published as Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 070503 (2014) · Extended and improved discussions. This version is published in Phys. Rev. Lett. 5 pages, 4 figures

arxiv created 2014/02/21 · arxiv updated 2014/02/24

Abstract

We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdropper actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD system into a completely insecure system. A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes. After about 1 W illumination, the detectors' dark count rate reduces 2 to 5 times, permanently improving single-photon counting performance. After about 1.5 W, the detectors switch permanently into the linear photodetection mode and become completely insecure for QKD applications.

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• A Binary Classifier-Based Wire Resistance Attack on the KLJN Secure Key Exchanger
• Binary Classifier Wire-Resistance Attack on KLJN: Impact of Narrowing the Resistor Gap
• Experimental Multi-Dimensional Side-Channel-Secure Quantum Key Distribution

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