Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage

2015/10/31 by Vadim Makarov, Jean-Philippe Bourgoin, Poompong Chaiwongkhot +7 · 2 citations
Physics and Astronomy · #quant-ph

paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physreva.94.030302

published as Phys. Rev. A 94, 030302 (2016) · Changed the title to match the journal version. 9 pages, 5 figures

arxiv created 2016/09/18 · arxiv updated 2016/09/20

Abstract

Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behaviour on-demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin-tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.

Cited by

• A Binary Classifier-Based Wire Resistance Attack on the KLJN Secure Key Exchanger
• Binary Classifier Wire-Resistance Attack on KLJN: Impact of Narrowing the Resistor Gap

Related

• Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography
• Laser seeding attack in quantum key distribution
• Spectral side channels in quantum key distribution under laser damage
• Study of the Vulnerability of Neutral Optical Filters Used in Quantum Key Distribution Systems against Laser Damage Attack
• Backflash Light as a Security Vulnerability in Quantum Key Distribution Systems