Fake News and Partisan Epistemology

2017/01/01 by Regina Rini · 4 citations
Computer Science · Social Sciences · #Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection #Misinformation and Its Impacts #Social Media and Politics

paper · doi:10.1353/ken.2017.0025

openalex publication_date 2017/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01

Abstract

This paper does four things: (1) It provides an analysis of the concept ‘fake news.’ (2) It identifies distinctive epistemic features of social media testimony. (3) It argues that partisanship-in-testimony-reception is not always epistemically vicious; in fact some forms of partisanship are consistent with individual epistemic virtue. (4) It argues that a solution to the problem of fake news will require changes to institutions, such as social media platforms, not just to individual epistemic practices.

Citations

• The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary
• Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments.
• Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice
• Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election

Cited by

• Retweeting: its linguistic and epistemic value
• Beyond Fact-Checking: The Importance of Logic-Checking in Public Discourse
• Disagreement, Public Reason, and Epistemic Abstinence
• Reblogging [wikipedia]

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• Fake news, relevant alternatives, and the degradation of our epistemic environment
• Posttruth, Truthiness, and Alternative Facts: Information Behavior and Critical Information Consumption for a New Age
• “Fake News” Is Not Simply False Information: A Concept Explication and Taxonomy of Online Content
• Defining “Fake News”
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