2010/03/12 by David W. Kearn · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #Agency (philosophy) #Arms control #Atomic energy #Control (management) #Disarmament #Economics #Fissile material #History #Interim #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Law #Law and economics #Management #Mandate #Negotiation #Neutron #Nuclear Issues and Defense #Nuclear physics #Nuclear weapon #Physics #Plan (archaeology) #Political science #Public administration #Sociology #Treaty
paper · doi:10.1080/09592290903577742
openalex publication_date 2010/03/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Arms control has emerged as a central component in the diplomatic approach unveiled by the Obama administration. With a long-term goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, interim steps include the revision and potential expansion of existing treaties and a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, including a potential Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Such a treaty would mandate that member states submit to rigorous inspection and cataloguing of their stocks of nuclear materials in return for assistance in the development of civilian nuclear programs. This approach, whilst ambitious, is not new. In this article I explore the development, negotiation and ultimate failure of what is often referred to as “the Baruch Plan,” the first attempt to cooperatively control atomic energy under the auspices of the newly formed United Nations. The failure of the Baruch Plan provides important lessons for scholars and practitioners, and underscores the inherent challenges of arms control cooperation.