2012/12/01 by Eric Budish · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Game Theory and Applications
paper · doi:10.1145/2509002.2509005
openalex publication_date 2012/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
In a typical mechanism design paper the goal is to find a mechanism that maximizes the designer's objective (e.g., social welfare) subject to technology and incentive constraints. In a typical applied matching paper, by contrast, the goal is to find a mechanism that satisfies various "good properties" (e.g., efficiency and fairness). This essay discusses the relationship and tradeoffs between these two approaches. An introductory example, school choice, represents a simple win for the good properties approach. The main example, course allocation, paints a more complicated picture.