2019/04/16 by Parimal K. Bag, P. Bag, Tridib Sharma · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Engineering · Mathematics · Social Sciences · #Advice (programming) #Artificial intelligence #Auction Theory and Applications #Bayesian probability #Computer science #Computer security #Decision maker #Engineering #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications #Mathematics #Operations research #Secrecy #Swing #Transparency (behavior)
paper · doi:10.1111/iere.12407
published in International Economic Review 60(4), 1877-1910 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 2019/04/16 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Abstract Two career‐concerned experts sequentially give advice to a Bayesian decision maker ( D ). We find that secrecy dominates transparency, yielding superior decisions for D . Secrecy empowers the expert moving late to be pivotal more often. Further, (i) only secrecy enables the second expert to partially communicate her information and its high precision to D and swing the decision away from first expert's recommendation; (ii) if experts have high average precision, then the second expert is effective only under secrecy. These results are obtained when experts only recommend decisions. If they also report the quality of advice, fully revealing equilibrium may exist.