Disentangling Obligations of Assistance: a Reply to Clare Palmer’s “Against the View That We Are Usually Required to Assist Wild Animals”

2015/11/01 by Cátia Faria · 3 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Environmental Science · Social Sciences · #Environmental Philosophy and Ethics #Geographies of human-animal interactions #Human-Animal Interaction Studies

paper · pdf · doi:10.7358/rela-2015-002-fari

openalex publication_date 2015/11/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01

Abstract

Animals are sentient individuals. They can be harmed and benefited by what happens to them. A significant number of nonhuman animals live under human control, yet the overwhelming majority of them live in the wild (Tomasik 2014). Many of the harms wild animals endure are due to natural events, rather than to human agency. Given the means at our disposal, wild animal suffering could be, to some extent, prevented or, at least, alleviated. This raises the question of whether we are morally required to intervene in nature to assist them or, alternatively, whether we may permissibly choose not to.

Citations

• What is Speciesism?

Cited by

• The Case for Welfare Biology
• Two Challenges to Johannsen on Habitat Destruction
• Clare Palmer [wikipedia]

Related

• Against the View That We Are Normally Required to Assist Wild Animals
• Wild Animal Suffering Is Not Intractable: A Precautionary Approach to Compassionate Intervention
• What (If Anything) Do We Owe Wild Animals?
• CONCERN FOR WILD ANIMAL SUFFERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF THE DISAGREEMENT?
• What the Wild Things Are: A Critique on Clare Palmer’s “What (If Anything) Do We Owe Wild Animals?”