2016/07/01 by William L. Reed, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom +1 · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.1177/2053168016666848
openalex publication_date 2016/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/22
This paper reports results from laboratory experiments on how commitment problems affect bargaining choices. Subjects are randomly assigned the conditions that produce a commitment problem in order to estimate the effect the commitment problem condition has on bargaining behavior. The empirical results suggest subjects are consistently responsive to the commitment problem condition. When presented with a commitment problem, most subjects identify the condition and choose the present day lottery over future negotiation. Moreover, subjects not exposed to the commitment problem condition bargain as if they were playing the one-stage ultimatum game. Subjects in both games are responsive to their own costs rather than their opponents, playing as if this complete information game were in an incomplete information setting.